[Blog] Lone, but not alone: right-wing terrorism and militant accelerationism in Japan

Over the past few years, the world has witnessed an apparent increase in ostensibly decentralized right-wing terrorist attacks by individuals who appear to act solely on their own behalf (i.e. without receiving instructions or material support from specific terrorist organizations). In response, criminologists have coined the term “lone wolf terrorism” for this strand of terrorism. These lone wolf attacks follow the pattern of so-called stochastic terrorism, which describes statistically likely attacks based on preceding defamation or demonization of a person or group, but which cannot be clearly predicted (1). The year 2019 has marked a particularly sad climax for such forms of lethal right-wing lone-wolf terrorism, as indicated by, among others, various attacks in the USA (El Paso, Pittsburgh, Poway, etc.), the Christchurch mosque shootings in New Zealand, and the attack on a synagogue in Halle, Germany. Researchers and investigators have recently argued that these “lone wolves” are, in fact, not alone at all, but are often radicalized by, and engaged in semantically and ideologically linked virtual networks of hate and radicalism on online boards like reddit or 4chan or social media.

Moreover, in an attempt to grasp this relatively new phenomenon of loosely connected right-wing extremists, being active on a variety of social media platforms, including sub-cultural chan-boards, Telegram or even TikTok (2), researchers have coined the concept of “militant accelerationism” ¹ to grasp the backgrounds and motivation of this new form of right-wing terror. Perpetrators falling into this category are sometimes organized in far-right extremist accelerationist groups on Telegram which orchestrate their actions among each other (3). However, in other cases – such as those discussed here – they are only loosely connected through the consumption of radical information online and by communicating with like-minded users in online forums. Thereby, they often share a certain set of connected ideological beliefs (sometimes explicitly expressed in manifestos left online), without ever having met in the real world. These persons usually do not orchestrate their actions with others, but they are aware of their peers, to the extent that some of them have even video-streamed their actions on smaller, rather unknown platforms to receive virtual live support from their online peers and to leave behind a visual documentation to abet their martyrization in the online realm. The strategical  aim of militant accelerationists is to expedite the collapse of an allegedly flawed “liberal, democratic and capitalist society” (3) or the return to an idealized imagined society (i.e. a highly conservative, ethnocentric nation with clear-bound social and cultural boundaries) with their terrorist actions. 

We argue that this notion of militant accelerationism is applicable to a series of right-wing attacks committed by individuals in Japan in the past years as well. So far, these attacks have been framed as single actions by individuals in the mass media and by investigators². However, by framing them as lone wolf actions, the virtual connectedness and mobilizing power of right-wing extremism on social media and chan-boards is largely overseen. Two of these most recent cases of internet-fueled right-wing extremist criminal acts have already been brought to court. The first case is that of a man setting fire to a Korean school and other buildings in Aichi in July 2021, followed by an arson attack on the Heiwa Kinenkan (the Peace Memorial Hall)³ in Utoro-district (Kyōto), an area known for being inhabited by Zainichi Koreans. As we know from his affidavit, the culprit harbored “hostile feelings” (敵対感情) towards Korean people for a long time, rooted in part in the idea that Koreans have “special rights” in Japan. This is an extremist view that was also propagated by the hate group Zaitokukai⁴, which organized various violent anti-Korean demonstrations in the early to mid-2010s and was also very visible on social media, especially video platforms such as Niconico dōga or YouTube⁵. From the affidavit we also know the source of his radicalization, namely the notoriously anti-Korean comments sections on Yahoo News, a news-site he had visited frequently⁶ (4).

Following the arson attack, a series of acts of criminal property damage took place in March–May 2022 in the Ōsaka area. Within this timespan, the perpetrator 1) broke into and rampaged the office of CDP-politician Tsujimoto Kiyomi⁷, 2) burgled a Korean school in the prefecture of Ibaraki with the aim to commit arson and 3) broke into premises of the Sōka Gakkai in Ōsaka (5). The broad mix of attack targets of this series of right-wing criminal actions is intriguing, since it overlaps with the common set of beliefs of radical Internet right-wingers in Japan (neto uyo). These include I) the idea that politicians of allegedly left-leaning oppositional parties are considered “anti-Japanese” (han’nichi), thus as individuals acting against “Japan’s interests”, II) the conspiracist belief that Korean diaspora-led schools are in fact controlled by North Korea, III) the assumption that the government is secretly run by a deep state of “shadowy manipulators”, including religious organizations such as Sōka Gakkai. Similar to the first case described above, the offender in this series of events also disclosed in his affidavit that he hates Korean people (嫌悪感) and in addition he held the conviction that Zainichi Koreans and North Koreans pose a threat to Japan if left unwatched. He also stated to have used social media (such as Twitter and YouTube) as main source of information. Although he did not specify the nature of the content he consumed online, merely stating that he uncritically believed the information he found on Twitter to be factual and accurate (6), it has become clear through the ongoing trial that this case falls into a common pattern typical for militant accelerationism as well, namely radicalization online, eventually leading to acts of right-wing violence in the real world. 

Finally, the assassination of former Prime Minister Abe Shinzô on July 8, 2022 represents the most drastic and recent case of militant accelerationism in Japan. Although this murder is often framed as a non-political act rooted in a personal grudge, and attention has since shifted away from the perpetrator’s radicalization (instead, ultimately shifting towards the religious movement known as the Unification Church and its well documented connection to politics), this perpetrator also radicalized himself through the Internet. In another contribution on this website, Stevie Poppe has argued that his statements posted on his Twitter account could be interpreted as a kind of fragmented manifesto, a pattern that is very typical for these types of attacks (as it was the case in the Christchurch and Halle cases). Poppe’s in-depth content analysis of the Twitter account revealed that “the perpetrator’s worldview is distinctly political and ties into the belief systems associated with online right-wing and misogynist sub-cultural communities.” Furthermore, the analysis brought to light that the perpetrator seemed to have harbored an imperative necessity to “protect” Japan from the Unification Church as a Korean, supposedly anti-Japanese organization (7). In conclusion, Poppe argues that we have to understand the perpetrator’s acts and worldview as a “Japanese expression of a growing and highly malleable global phenomenon of internet-fueled far-right and libertarian-right ideologies,” and that there is thus a need for a conceptual framework helping understand the assassin’s actions beyond that of a single man acting out of a personal grudge, instead viewing it “as part of a large, transnational series of lone-wolf terror attacks by (young) men both expressing and absorbing their views on subcultural online media.” We believe that this set of motivations aligns with the testimony of the previously mentioned attacker aiming at the politician’s office, i.e. as mentioned above that “leaving Zainichi Koreans and North Koreans in Japan unattended puts Japan at risk.” (6)

 Therefore, in line with Poppe’s analysis, we argue that all three cases fall into the framework of right-wing militant accelerationism. All three perpetrators exhibited a racist attitude toward the Zainichi Korean diaspora, and they perceived it as a clear anti-Japanese element and a threat to an idealized, ethnically homogeneous Japanese society. In two of the three cases, this hatred was combined with a conspiratorial belief that specific religious organizations – i.e. the Unification Church or Sōka Gakkai – were pulling the strings in the background of Japan’s politics. Moreover, two of the three perpetrators pursued aims associated with political parties. The first one was attacking the “anti-Japanese” political opposition (CDP), the other one, despite not being an enemy of the politics of the LDP under Abe per se, wanted to unveil the secret connections between the Unification Church and the LDP by assassinating Abe. The latter might thus be considered an attempt to purge the LDP from these malicious influences.

Accordingly, it can be argued that other ideological strands (i.e. conspiratorial and/or anti-left convictions) are likely to be connected to a xenophobic stance, merging into the grand han’nichi conspiratorial narrative which is infamously propagated by the netto uyoku. This merging of xenophobia with a conspiratorial fear of being controlled by some other major group operating in the shadows results in the linkage of two highly emotional connotated worldviews.  Fueled by the radicalizing mechanisms of chan-boards and social media, it is not surprising that an extensive consumption of compatible opinions and information can trigger emotional escalation. This combination of antagonism and fear can lead to the desire to accelerate the process of overthrowing this society that is being “threatened” by these allegedly malicious groups. The resulting violent attacks are presumably intended to raise society’s awareness and even trigger subsequent copy-cat attacks (as it is not rarely the case).

Therefore, it is important to understand that these lone perpetrators are never acting alone, since they do not radicalize in isolation, but through networks of like-minded peers on social media. This is also what makes it very difficult for investigators and prosecutors to anticipate or forstall their actions. In order to effectively counteract this new form of right-wing terrorism, it is important that researchers and investigators alike understand the radicalization process and to educate law enforcement and judicial officials on this topic to ensure competent follow-up or even prevention of radicalization. Moreover, the toothless tiger of an anti-hate speech law needs to be revised to counter the unrestrained circulation of hate and discrimanation online, igniting hatred and eventually leading to violence in the real world.

Sources

(1) Amman, Molly & J.Reid Meloy (2021): Stochastic Terrorism: A linguistic and Psychological Analysis. In “Perspectives on Terrorism”, Volume 15, Issue 5 https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/binaries/content/assets/customsites/perspectives-on-terrorism/2021/issue-5/amman-and-meloy.pdf

(2) https://gnet-research.org/2022/07/18/examining-white-supremacist-and-militant-accelerationism-trends-on-tiktok/

(3) https://cemas.io/en/publications/militant-accelerationism/CeMAS_Militant_Accelerationism_Origins_and_Developments_in_Germany.pdf

(4) https://www.buzzfeed.com/jp/kotahatachi/utoro-arson-hatecrime-judgment-2

(5) https://www.buzzfeed.com/jp/kotahatachi/hatecrime-osaka-3?utm_source=dynamic&utm_campaign=bfsharefacebook&fbclid=IwAR3CkF-S2eKI1Nxe3t9GvCB3MVPpPu6pvtfgRY6IIfSOwEYHxbJhHa-_jfo 

(6) https://www.buzzfeed.com/jp/kotahatachi/hatecrime-osaka-2?utm_source=dynamic&utm_campaign=bfsharefacebook&fbclid=IwAR3C2RwN4R5K0iIQ9f7Kee9hXrFZXniDXfi6-9JQNf9cS8xrFfk8XaGSsuE

(7) https://www.digital-japan.org/2022/08/19/analysis-of-the-twitter-account-of-abe-shinzos-killer/